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Successful navigation of the social world requires making accurate inferences 
about the contents of other people’s minds, being able to represent in one’s own mind 
the thoughts, beliefs, and intentions of another. This “theory of mind” (ToM) ability 
allows us to explain and predict others’ behavior in terms of their mental states (1). 
As reported in PNAS, Bio et al. (2) show that when prompted to adopt the visual 
perspective of a cartoon agent participants demonstrated the same spatial bias as when 
processing objects from their own perspective. Interestingly, this effect occurred only 
when the cartoon agent held a false belief about the location of an object, due to its 
having moved while the agent’s view was blocked by a barrier. When the agent held a 
true belief about the location of the object, either because he had witnessed it move or 
it never moved from its original location after the barrier appeared, participants’ own 
spatial bias had no effect on perspective taking (see Fig. 1A for a description of the 
experimental paradigm). Bio et al. conclude that when representing others’ true 
beliefs, compared with their false beliefs, social cognition may be engaged to a lesser 
extent or not at all. This study is important because it may provide an answer to one 
of the most challenging questions in current ToM research: What is it to represent 
mental states to a greater or lesser degree?  
 
Despite 40 years of ToM research (1), two related questions remain 
unanswered. The first concerns individual differences in ToM ability: What does it 
mean for an individual to be “better” at ToM than another individual? There is 
substantial evidence that individual differences in general cognitive abilities such as 
intelligence, language, or memory (3–7), have an impact on ToM tasks, but such 
skills are not specific to mental-state representation and would improve performance 
on any task. The second relates to ToM tasks: What does it mean for one task to 
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require a “greater degree” of ToM than another? Perhaps the most successful effort to 
date in determining a metric by which to judge the difficulty of ToM processing has 
been a scale developed by Wellman and Liu (8) that is derived from the order in 
which children typically are able to represent different categories of mental states. For 
instance, children tend to understand that other people can hold different beliefs from 
their own before being able to ascribe false beliefs to them. However, the order of 
successfully representing different mental-state categories differs across cultures (9, 
10), indicating that variability may depend more on what children are taught about 
minds (11) rather than providing any objective measure, or explanation, of the degree 
to which a particular type of ToM representation is more difficult than another.  
 
These problems intersect when trying to interpret performance on tests of 
ToM ability; for each type of mental-state representation, ToM is presented as a pass-
or-fail ability – children either can represent mental state type X, Y, or Z, or they 
cannot. Such binary responses cannot capture variance in ToM, or what it is to engage 
in mental-state representation to a greater or lesser degree. After children acquire the 
ToM ability for each category, typically by the age of five (12), it is not clear what 
“more” or “better” ToM is. There is a lack of theorising on variance in ToM (between 
tasks and between individuals) that can address the differential quality of mental-state 
representations. Within this context it is extremely interesting to consider the novel 
task developed by Bio et al. (2).  
 
Bio et al. employ a task designed to evoke two mental-state categories, true vs. 
false beliefs. In contrast to false beliefs, true beliefs have been considered problematic 
as a ToM measure (13, 14) as their representational content is the same as the true 
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state of the world, making it impossible to tell whether one is truly representing 
another person’s mental state or simply reporting one’s own representation of reality. 
Bio et al. suggest that their findings indicate that ToM was engaged and required 
only, or to a greater degree, in the false-belief condition. They suggest that on true-
belief trials participants may have shown no spatial bias as they did not represent the 
agent’s mental state, or did so to a lesser degree, and therefore did not represent the 
agent’s visual perspective. Based on this explanation, individual differences in ToM 
may be construed as the extent to which representing the cartoon as a mental agent 
prompted one to adopt his visual perspective. If so, this represents an interesting new 
measure of individual differences in ToM. In contrast to existing measures, the 
dependant variable does not reflect whether one can represent particular classes of 
mental states, or the accuracy of mental state inference, but rather the social 
consequences (visual perspective taking) of false-belief attribution. When construed 
in this manner, it is interesting to speculate whether those with a “higher” degree of 
ToM, or a greater propensity to represent the mental states of others, may also show 
such an effect on true-belief trials even when the representation of the agent’s mental 
state is not strictly necessary for task performance. If so, one might expect a 
correlation between the propensity to engage in ToM and the difference in spatial bias 
between true- and false-belief conditions.  
 
On false-belief trials, participants were prompted to respond from another 
agent’s visual perspective when it conflicted with their own. This was demonstrated 
by the fact that the participant’s own degree of horizontal left-right spatial bias was 
evident in their responses to what were vertically arranged target locations from their 
perspective, but horizontally arranged target locations if they adopted the agent’s 
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perspective. It is interesting that the authors suggest that participants may have 
attributed their own spatial bias to the agent, as egocentric projection in ToM often 
indicates a less accurate representation of another’s mind (15). In this task, as in many 
ToM tasks, one is asked to infer the mental state of an anonymous agent in the 
absence of any knowledge about his mind. When required to represent the mental 
states of such an agent, there are at least two strategies one could take: One could 
either predict the mental state of the average mind in that situation or predict one’s 
own mental state in that situation. When these conflict, probabilistically one is more 
likely to be accurate if one represents the mental state of the average mind. 
Accordingly, perhaps those participants who are most accurate at representing the 
spatial bias of the cartoon agent are those who do not attribute their own spatial bias 
to the agent, but instead represent the veridical average degree of spatial bias in this 
sample (no spatial bias), or that commonly observed in the previous literature (a left 
spatial bias (2)).  
 
One further possibility is that instead of representing the cartoon agent’s visual 
perspective, participants were instead representing the spatial arrangement of the 
stimuli from a position centred on the agent’s viewpoint. The former case would have 
mentalistic representational content and be mediated by social cognitive processes. In 
contrast, the latter case would not require any representation of the agent’s mental 
state and be mediated by nonsocial object-centred spatial processing. As an example, 
consider the case of a guest at a wedding who wants to ensure she is visible in the 
wedding photograph. She could do so either by imagining the perspective of the 
photographer through the camera lens (a mentalistic process), or by calculating 
whether there is an unobstructed straight line between her and the camera lens (a 
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nonmentalistic process). Whether performance is driven by representations of mental 
states on specific tasks is a long-standing debate in the ToM literature, particularly for 
ToM tasks where the responses are nonverbal and relatively fast (16, 17). 
Dissociating mentalistic from nonmentalistic accounts of nonverbal ToM tasks is 
typically achieved by including a nonsocial control condition, in which the agent is 
replaced by an inanimate object to which it is not appropriate to attribute mental states 
(18, 19). Cameras are frequently used in tasks that manipulate beliefs on the basis of 
visual representations, as photographs provide visual representations of a scene but 
are not mental states, and can, like beliefs, become “false” representations of reality 
with the passage of time (20). See Fig. 1B for an example of how such a nonsocial 
camera control condition could be incorporated into the paradigm used by Bio et al. in 
future research. Such further work could establish whether, as currently hypothesised, 
participants may not have fully represented the agent’s true beliefs, or whether in fact 
no belief representation occurred on either true- or false-belief trials.  
 
While any new task prompts a variety of questions about the factors that 
determine performance, Bio et al. (2) are to be congratulated on conceiving of an 
entirely novel approach to understanding individual differences in ToM. Rather than 
the accuracy of mental-state inference, the ability to represent different types of 
mental state, or the propensity with which one engages in mental-state reasoning, 
their novel task attempts to measure the consequences of mental-state representation 
on other social cognitive processes. Whether this approach proves fruitful will only be 
determined by further empirical and theoretical work, but their paper provides a 
possible glimpse of the solution to the deep problem of how to conceive of degrees of 
ToM, a problem which has vexed the field since its inception. 
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Fig. 1. A social “false-belief” condition (A) in the task by Bio et al. (2) and an 
analogous nonsocial “false-photo” condition (B). Two agents view (A) and two video 
cameras record (B) a scene in which a ball appears in one of two boxes. An occluder 
then appears between one of the agents/cameras and the ball, before it moves to the 
other box. Participants are asked to indicate in which box the agent thinks the ball is 
(social version, A) or where the ball was last visible in the video (nonsocial version, 
B). In their social version, Bio et al. (2) found participants responded faster to either 
box 1 or 2, situated on the left and right of the agent’s head, depending on their own 
bias in processing either the left or right side of space. Comparing social and 
nonsocial conditions could distinguish between mentalistic and nonmentalistic 
explanations of this effect.  
